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Note
Oh the Places Stockholders Will Go! A Guide for
Navigating Forum Selection Bylaws Outside of
Delaware
Stephanna F. Szotkowski*
Until 2010, the law regarding intra-corporate disputes was
relatively settled: stockholders initiated derivative suits in the
state of incorporation on behalf of and in the name of the corpo1
ration. More often than not, litigants chose Delaware, the state
2
of incorporation for most corporations. Vice Chancellor Laster
of the Delaware Court of Chancery questioned this presumptive
3
default in his 2010 In re Revlon opinion. He suggested that
corporations could adopt charter provisions selecting an exclu4
sive forum for intra-corporate litigation. These unprecedented
words appeared to give corporate boards of directors the green
light to confine certain types of suits to the Delaware Court of
Chancery, eliminating shareholders’ opportunities for multi* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Professors Jessica
Clarke, Claire Hill, John Matheson, and Brett McDonnell as well as Mary
Eaton and Joel Greenberg for their invaluable guidance in preparing this
Note. Special thanks to Melissa Card, Rachel Kitze, Robin Lehninger, Kim
Scriver, Emily Willborn, and the members of the Minnesota Law Review for
their comments and editing assistance. Finally, deepest thanks to my parents,
Peter and Nancy, my brothers, Peter and Sam, and Daniel Eck for their love
and support. Copyright © 2014 by Stephanna F. Szotkowski.
1. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The History of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336−37 n.10
(2012).
2. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J.
553, 578 (2002) (stating that 85% of corporations that incorporated out-of-state
choose to incorporate in Delaware).
3. See In re Revlon Inc., S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010) (“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution,
then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
4. Id.

1980
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5

forum litigation and forum shopping. This simultaneous exist6
ence and lack of a choice had never before been self-evident.
The Vice Chancellor mentioned certificates of incorporation,
7
but not bylaws —it remained unclear whether forum selection
8
bylaws would be enforceable.
The first case outside of Delaware testing these new pa9
rameters was Galaviz v. Berg. Oracle Corporation’s board of
directors amended its bylaws after (later-alleged) wrongdoing
10
to provide for exclusive litigation in Delaware. The District
Court for the Northern District of California refused to enforce
11
the forum selection clause. The court reasoned that as a matter of federal common law and not Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), directors could not control forum selection by
unilateral action in a manner that could not be achieved in contract law, which requires mutual assent to contractual modifi12
cations.
Together, In re Revlon and Galaviz generated significant
questions about the utility and enforceability of forum selection
clauses in the corporate context. They reignited an ongoing debate about the proper role of the corporate board in relation to
stockholders; they drew attention to the phenomenon of multijurisdictional litigation and entrepreneurial plaintiffs that
13
drove the need for forum selection. Practitioners advised their

5. The forum selection clause would apply in four types of suits: derivative, fiduciary duties, suits involving Delaware General Corporate Law, and
internal affairs suits. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron
Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 950–51 (Del. Ch. 2013); Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A.
Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 358 n.156 (2013).
6. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 336−38.
7. In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960 n.8.
8. Commentators generally agreed that forum selection clauses in corporate charters were enforceable. See, e.g., Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 141–42 (2011). Due to the greater consensus in this
area, the enforceability of forum selection clauses in charter provisions will not
be the focus of this Note.
9. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
10. Id. at 1171–72 (overcharging the United States government millions
of dollars in the sale of software and licenses).
11. Id. at 1171.
12. Id. at 1174–75.
13. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Foreword: The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, Continuity—and Competition, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387,
390−92.
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clients to include such clauses, “just in case.” Proxy advisor
groups encouraged corporations not to adopt clauses in their
15
bylaws. Stockholder plaintiffs challenged directors’ unilateral
adoption of forum selection bylaws through derivative litiga16
tion. Proponents countered with director authority and fiduci17
ary duty analyses. Then, on June 25, 2013, the Delaware
Court of Chancery handed down a much-anticipated decision
that arose from a wave of derivative suits filed in February
2012.
In Boilermakers, Chancellor Strine upheld forum selection
bylaws unilaterally adopted by the boards of directors of Chevron and FedEx, two Delaware corporations that faced deriva18
tive suits. The ruling limited its analysis to clarifying that bylaws are statutorily and contractually valid; it did not discuss
19
fact-laden fiduciary duties. The decision erased much of the
uncertainty surrounding forum selection bylaws, but signifi20
cant questions remain. The impact of the holding outside of
21
Delaware for Delaware corporations remains tenuous. Poten14. See, e.g., Bonnie White, Note, Reevaluating Galaviz v. Berg: An Analysis of Forum-Selection Provisions in Unilaterally Adopted Corporate Bylaws as
Requirements Contracts, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 390, 391 n.4 (2012).
15. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 1.9 (2013), available at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_
policies. Proxy advisor groups make recommendations for and gather most of
their data from proxy seasons, the time of the year when most corporations
hold their annual stockholder meetings. See, e.g., Paul Rose, On the Role and
Regulation of Proxy Advisors, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62–63
(2011). Their impact comes primarily from increased stockholder scrutiny generated by their recommendations; they are highly influential in corporate governance. See, e.g., id.
16. See, e.g., Verified Complaint at ¶ 74, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret.
Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2012) (No. 7220), 2012 WL
485390 [hereinafter Biolermakers Verified Complaint].
17. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 330; see also infra Part II(B).
18. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
19. Id. at 950–58 (explaining that forum selection clauses that relate to
“internal affairs” are proper subject matter of bylaws and that they constitute
“flexible,” unilaterally-adopted contracts between the stockholders and the
board).
20. See Theodore Mirvis, Surrender in the Forum Selection Bylaw Battle,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:21
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/28/surrender-in-the-forum
-selection-bylaw-battle.
21. Since the plaintiffs in Boilermakers withdrew their appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, the decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery
stands. It is therefore only persuasive precedent for non-Delaware courts,
which will have to choose whether to accept Chancellor Strine’s reasoning.
BONNIE J. ROE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS (2013),
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tial choice of law, choice of forum, fiduciary duties, and judicial
applications of public policy permutations will likely result in
22
non-uniform interpretation of the decision. Stockholders have
brains in their heads, feet in their shoes, and may steer themselves in any direction they choose, but courts are the ones who
23
must decide where they go.
This Note aims to provide a guide for courts outside of Delaware to determine the enforceability of forum selection bylaws. Though Boilermakers established that forum selection bylaws are likely enforceable in Delaware, foreign courts must
24
contend with how to interpret and apply the decision. This
guide will focus on DGCL law, which presumptively applies to
25
“internal affairs” disputes of Delaware corporations. It will also limit analysis to how courts should grapple with highly factintensive, potential fiduciary duties cases that Boilermakers
26
did not address. The guide aims to craft a middle position between directors’ multi-jurisdictional concerns and stockholders’
fiduciary duties worries. Part I describes the terrain: the corporate-contractual structure, the “Out of Delaware” trend, and
the In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers progression. Part
II dissects arguments for and against the enforceability of forum selection bylaws, with a focus on policy, authority, and fiduciary duties arguments that structure the multi-step solution. Part III proposes and applies a framework of decision for
use in non-Delaware jurisdictions. The solution suggests that
directors have the authority to adopt forum selection bylaws, as
27
upheld in Boilermakers. Stockholder-plaintiffs may rebut this
presumption by showing that directors have breached their fiavailable at http://http://www.cohengresser.com/assets/publications/11_1_
2013_The_Future_of_Exclusive_Forum_Bylaws_BJR_DHT_JHH.pdf.
22. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (suggesting that directors may lack the power to unilaterally adopt forum selection
clauses); see also In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 459–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a forum selection clause unenforceable).
23. See generally, DR. SEUSS, OH, THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! (1990).
24. Besides fiduciary duties, they must confront other issues beyond the
scope of this Note—including potential choice of law, choice of forum, and judicial applications of public policy—which will likely result in non-uniform interpretation of the decision.
25. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 937 (Del. Ch. 2013).
26. Id. at 947.
27. Id. at 939–41. Forum selection bylaws are “flexible,” binding contracts
that are presumptively enforceable because of directors’ authority. Id. at 939.
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duciary duties in adopting a forum selection clause. If they
are successful, directors must demonstrate the “entire fairness”
29
of the forum selection bylaw to the stockholders. At all times,
directors may waive the forum selection bylaws if their fiduci30
ary duties so require. Hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the
contours of this approach for breaches of the duty of care and
31
loyalty. Ultimately, this structure provides a solution for nonDelaware courts that mediates stockholders’ and directors’ respective fiduciary duties and multi-jurisdictional litigation concerns.
I. FROM CORPORATE STRUCTURE TO FORUM
SELECTION
In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers have recently
shaken the world of intra-corporate, derivative litigation. Each
involves forum selection clauses that require derivative suits
brought by stockholder-plaintiffs in foreign courts, outside the
32
state of incorporation, to be dismissed or transferred. To understand the cumulative import of these cases, the questions
that they leave unanswered, and the framework for how foreign
courts may respond, it is necessary to understand the basics.
This section addresses corporate structure and the history of
forum selection in the corporate context: the bedrock of this debate.
A. CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The basic corporate structure informs and defines the enforceability of forum selection bylaws. Forum selection bylaws
contain corporate attributes, which will first be analyzed, that
arise from the legal model of a corporation and its organic corporate documents. Forum selection introduces a contractual element to the corporate structure that will be analyzed in terms

28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that a fiduciary duties analysis is necessarily case-by-case and highly factdependent); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 95–96 (Del. 1992) (cautioning against determining issues involving hypothetical harm).
32. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 326 (“[These] provisions are
thus nothing more than licenses that permit corporations to appear before foreign courts to petition for the dismissal of foreign-filed complaints so that the
litigation can be pursued in the courts of the chartering jurisdiction.”).
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of its impact on the certificate and bylaws, as well as its binding precedent.
1. The Legal Model of the Corporation
Corporations are statutory creatures, viewed as separate
33
legal entities from their stockholder-owners. Stockholders’
main duties include electing directors and voting on fundamen34
tal corporate actions. Directors constitute the decision-making
35
and managerial body of the corporation. The board of directors
36
selects officers. Both directors and officers, the corporate
management organs, have fiduciary duties, contractual requirements, and agency obligations to act in the best interests
37
of the corporation. Good faith, loyalty, and due care form the
triad of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, although due
38
care and loyalty predominate. In litigation, the business
judgment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that directors
39
acted pursuant to their fiduciary duties. If stockholders rebut
this presumption, courts review the transaction at issue under

33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a corporation as
“[a]n entity . . . having authority under law to act as a single person distinct
from the shareholders who own it.”).
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
150 (4th ed., 1969).
35. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed by its
board of directors.”).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See John H. Matheson, Choice of Organizational Form for the StartUp Business, 1(2) MINN. J. BUS. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 16 (2002).
38. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). To fulfill
their duty of care, directors must engage in a process of informed deliberation.
Id. Directors’ standard of care for liability is gross negligence. See, e.g., In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005) (defining
gross negligence as “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the
whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The duty of loyalty requires directors to
act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders, rather than
their own personal interests. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 816 (Del.
1984). Self-dealing, when a director is on both sides of a transaction, is a classic example. See id. at 812. Directors are independent if they make decisions
based on corporate merits, not personal, extraneous considerations. Id. at 816.
Delaware courts have considered the duty of good faith a subsidiary element of
the fundamental duty of loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del.
2006) (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 49, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). As
such, I will focus on the two fundamental fiduciary duties—care and loyalty.
39. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1989).
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an entire fairness standard. In addition to fiduciary duties,
organic corporate documents, the certificate of incorporation
and bylaws bind shareholders, directors, and officers and struc41
ture internal corporate affairs.
2. Organic Corporate Documents: Certificate of Incorporation
& Bylaws
The certificate of incorporation and bylaws serve as the
main corporate governance and operating documents, respec42
tively. In Delaware, after the certificate is filed with the Secretary of State, the board must propose any amendments that
43
stockholders approve by a simple majority vote. Bylaws govern internal corporate affairs and relationships among direc44
tors, officers, and stockholders. Under the DGCL, “[t]he bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or
with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers
45
or employees.” The power to approve, amend, or repeal bylaws
vests primarily with stockholders, but can be delegated concur46
rently to directors in the charter. Bylaw adoptions are binding
on directors and stockholders, but they remain subordinate to

40. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362–64 (Del. 1993),
modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376
(Del. 1993).
41. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 3:12 (3d ed. 2013).
42. See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 209 (2005). Varying by jurisdiction, the certificate is also called the articles of incorporation or the charter. Id. These terms will be used interchangeably.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103(a)(1) (West 2013) (filing with the Secretary of State), 242(b)(1) (process for amending bylaws).
44. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234–35 (Del.
2008); COX & HAZEN, supra note 41, at § 3.12; McDonnell, supra note 42, at
207, 217, 221 (delineating bylaws’ procedural and corporate governance attributes and defining certain bylaws as a poison pill and a “leading antitakeover defense”).
45. Tit. 8, § 109(b).
46. See id. § 109. However, delegation of concurrent power does not limit
stockholders’ power to amend bylaws. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582,
588 (1933); Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d,
670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of
Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 132
(2009). Nor does it limit stockholders’ plenary, statutory, default right. See
Rogers, 289 U.S. at 588–89.
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This governance model has ana-

3. Contractual Views of the Certificate and Bylaws
Judicial decisions, including Galaviz and Boilermakers,
have grappled with how to square the corporate management
48
structure with corporations’ contractual attributes. Different
49
theories define corporations as a nexus of contracts or as a le50
gal entity, distinct from its aggregate members. Delaware
courts have historically and recently labeled certificates and
51
bylaws in contractual terms. In Boilermakers, the court explained that forum selection provisions constitute binding,
“flexible” contracts between the corporation and its stockhold52
ers. The Galaviz court, in contrast, sought to explicitly divorce
53
corporate from contract law. However, as Boilermakers
showed, courts may apply U.S. Supreme Court’s Bremen precedent that had previously only applied to contractual forum se54
lection clauses.
4. Forum Selection Provisions Are Valid in Contracts
Since the United States Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in
Bremen, the modern trend is that contractual forum selection
55
clauses are prima facie valid. The Court strengthened this po56
sition in Carnival Cruise Lines. Parties challenging contractual forum selection provisions must overcome this presump47. See tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(1), 109(b).
48. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
49. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 6 (2d ed. 2009) (defining a corporation’s entity as a “nexus of contracts” and a “nexus for contracts”).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188
(Del. 2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders.”).
52. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939
(Del. Ch. 2013).
53. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
54. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 940 (“Therefore, this
court will enforce the forum selection bylaws in the same way it enforces any
other forum selection clause, in accordance with the principles set down by the
United States Supreme Court in Bremen.”).
55. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
56. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593
−95 (1 991) (extending Bremen’s presumption of enforceability to standardized form contracts
that are contracts of adhesion).
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57

tion of enforceability. When courts encounter these clauses,
58
they dismiss, transfer, or stay cases. Until very recently, forum selection clauses abounded in contracts, but not in organic
59
corporate documents. The trend to superimpose contractual
structures in the corporate context grew from the “Out of Delaware” trend and the phenomenon of multi-jurisdictional litiga60
tion.
B. FORUM SELECTION IN CORPORATE LAW
Stockholder-plaintiffs who brought derivative suits historically, presumptively sued in the state of incorporation. This
61
was usually Delaware. Delaware and its court system confer
many benefits on its corporations: network externalities, a welldeveloped infrastructure of professionals and expert corporate
judges, equitable corporate law, predictability and expediency
62
of decisions, and prestige. The Delaware court system was
63
and is “the Mother Court of corporate law.” Pursuant to the
internal affairs doctrine, the DGCL presumptively governs de-

57. Hadley v. Shaffer, No. Civ.A. 99-144-JJF, 2003 WL 21960406, at *4
(D. Del. 2003) (holding that forum selection contractual provisions are presumptively valid unless “(i) [the forum selection clause] is a result of fraud or
overreaching; (ii) enforcement would violate a strong public policy of the forum; or (iii) enforcement would, in the particular circumstances of the case,
result in litigation in a jurisdiction so seriously inconvenient as to be unreasonable”); see also Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 199, 207−09 (2008).
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a),
1406 (2012). Or courts apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens for permissive forum selection clauses. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 50−51.
The Delaware Court of Chancery uses motions to dismiss for improper venue
under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(3). Id. at 62−63 and its McWane presumption disfavors granting stays for later-filed actions. Stevelman, supra note 46,
at 62.
59. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 338.
60. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 33−34 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 638−39 (2012).
61. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 66−67; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note
2, at 578.
62. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345, 1348−50 (2012); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 2, at 556, 588, 596−97.
63. Armour et al. supra note 60, at 1346; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 679−84 (1986); Stevelman, supra note 46, at 71−72 (adding that
eighty-five to ninety percent of Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinions are not
appealed, affirming the acknowledged superiority of their judgments).
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64

rivative disputes. Businesses incorporate in Delaware, knowing that their implicit choice of law is “sticky” and will pre65
sumptively govern outside of Delaware. Historically, choice of
66
forum for intra-corporate disputes also “stuck.” The prevailing
belief was that both plaintiffs and defendants preferred the
67
Delaware court system. However, scholars have documented
the movement of intra-corporate litigation out of Delaware
since the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Changes in federal securities laws, plaintiffs’ strategies,
and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s responses have coalesced
68
into the “Out of Delaware” trend. Delaware courts traditional69
ly took a hands-off approach to multi-jurisdictional litigation.
The plaintiffs’ bar responded by what Chancellor Strine has
70
deemed the “lead counsel Olympics race.” The first entrepreneurial plaintiff to file won a lion’s share of the eventual award
and an effectual stay of later-filed, substantially similar com71
plaints. This approach resulted in a flurry of low-quality
72
pleadings due to the significant first-mover advantage. Vice
64. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine 6 (Emory L. & Econ. Research Paper, No. 06-04, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686592.
65. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 80. Known as “Lex Incorporationis,” this
phenomenon explains that the law of the incorporating state “sticks” to the
corporation’s internal affairs and provides a “clear, stable rule for resolving
conflicts of laws questions.” Id.
66. Armour et al. supra, note 60, at 637−38.
67. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 374 (citing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993) (“[P]laintiffs do not perceive it to
be undesirable to litigate in Delaware and instead take advantage of its valuable asset of legal capital.”)). Practically, this legal capital included a historical
laissez faire approach to awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. The parties
would agree on the amount and the court would approve it. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 496 (1987).
68. See infra notes 70–80.
69. See Armour et al., supra note 60, at 622−25. Multiple suits stemming
from the same set of facts is one of the most noted scenarios underlying the
“Out of Delaware” trend. Generally, Delaware courts required lawyers to organize themselves. Id.
70. Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 483−84 (2012).
71. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 107.
72. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed? 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
9−10 (2012); Quinn, supra note 8, at 147 (explaining that this probably is
acute in the merger context, “[w]here there were multiple suits filed, the average number of lawsuits was 5.3 per transaction, with a median of four lawsuits per transaction”); MARK LEBOVITCH ET AL., BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ
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Chancellor Chandler responded by identifying factors that the
73
court would use to determine lead counsel. The Delaware
Court of Chancery also began to more closely scrutinize attor74
neys’ fee arrangements reached by parties.
Plaintiffs considered themselves hostages to corporate de75
fendants’ interests; they began filing outside of Delaware.
Changes in federal securities laws only augmented these incen76
tives. Plaintiffs’ forum-shopping and settlement posturing tac77
tics increased litigation costs for defendants. They forced for78
eign courts to decide matters of Delaware law. Corporate
defendants prefer Delaware because of the unpredictability of
79
foreign courts and judges’ understanding of corporate law.
Multi-jurisdictional litigation also leaves open the possibility of
BERGER & GROSSMAN, MAKING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION IN MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGERRELATED LITIGATION 4−5 (2011), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_
files/MakingOrderoutofChaos.
73. Cheffins et al., supra note 70, at 483 (listing “the quality of the pleadings filed, the energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by the attorneys, and the
economic stake that each plaintiff had in the litigation”).
74. Armour et al., supra note 60, at 1359−60; see In re Cox Communications, Inc. S’holders Litigation, 879 A.3d 604, 643 (Del. Ch. 2005); see, e.g., In
re Instinent Group Inc., S’holders Litigation (Del. Ch., 2005) (reducing a $1.62
million fee agreement to $450,000).
75. See Stevelman, supra note 46, at 97−98 (“Prior to their tenure . . .
most Delaware judges were members of corporate/defense-side Wilmington
law firms.”).
76. In the 1980s, securities class action litigation boomed. Id. In response,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), that included a heightened pleading standard. Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998). Plaintiffs moved to state court to avoid the PSLRA. See
Coffee, supra note 63, at 684. Congress responded by passing the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). 112 Stat. 3227. However,
SLUSA contained a “Delaware “carve-out” exception that exempted actions
based on corporate law of a corporation’s state of incorporation. Armour et al.,
supra note 60, at 1378. Plaintiffs responded by filing “parallel” or “tagalong”
derivative suits under state corporate law to qualify and to proceed to discovery that would be unavailable in PLSRA litigation. Id. This did not work in
Delaware. Id. Delaware courts stay suits when a motion to dismiss is pending.
Id. at 1378−79. Multi-jurisdictional litigation flourished.
77. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 72, at 6−7.
78. Stevelman, supra note 46, at 64−65 (detailing Delaware judges’ “h ubristic” claim on the development of their law, but noting that foreign rulings
have no precedential effect on Delaware law, but may serve a policing function).
79. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 72, at 30 (“Company-side lawyers
[have] said . . . that judges in state courts outside of Delaware were far less
likely to be expert in corporate law and that their reaction to stockholder suits
was harder to predict—never a good thing.”).
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80

inconsistent outcomes from different judges. It wastes judicial
resources because cases could be consolidated or litigated only
81
in one forum. In the end, however, stockholders suing on behalf of the corporation suffer most because multi-jurisdictional
82
litigation increases costs to the corporation. In response, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has hesitated to stay concurrent
proceedings, has attempted to lure plaintiffs back, and has emphasized the comparative advantage, predictability, and effi83
ciency of interpreting its own corporate law. Against this
backdrop, In re Revlon Galaviz, and Boilermakers changed the
nature of derivative litigation.
C. IN RE REVLON, GALAVIZ, & BOILERMAKERS CHANGE INTRACORPORATE LITIGATION
Prior to Vice Chancellor Laster’s In re Revlon decision in
2010, no opinion had ever considered the possibility of forum
84
selection bylaw or certificate provisions. The only persuasive
Delaware case prior to 2010 involved an arbitration clause in a
85
86
LLC agreement. Enter In re Revlon. Vice Chancellor Laster
suggested in dicta that corporations may consider adopting fo87
rum selection clauses in their certificates. He did not mention
bylaws. Galaviz was the first case to apply the In re Revlon
88
proposition to bylaws. The court held that the directordefendants, who amended the corporation’s bylaws after al-

80. See Lebovitch et al., supra note 72, at 2 (posing full faith and due credit problems).
81. Quinn, supra note 8, at 152.
82. Id.
83. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 344 (citing In re Southern Peru Copper
Corp., 52 A.3d 761, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011) (awarding plaintiffs $304 million in
attorneys’ fees, $1.347 billion in damages, and pre-judgment interest).
84. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 338. Prior to 2010, only sixteen publicly
traded entities had forum selection clauses in their organic corporate documents. Id. at 352. Eight were LLCs or LLPs and eight were corporations. Id.
The earliest clauses appeared in 1991, 1992, and 1994 and then there was a
twelve year gap until 2006, when Oracle did so, which would later become the
subject of Galaviz. See id. The first mention of the possibility of using a bylaw
to introduce a forum selection clause was proposed in 2007. Id. at 338 (crediting Theodore Mirvis, a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz).
85. Lewis, supra note 57, at 207 (upholding the provision because the
Delaware LLC Act does not prohibit such clauses in an LLC agreement).
86. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litigation, 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010).
87. Id.
88. See generally Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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leged wrongdoing to include a forum selection clause, could not
89
disregard the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
After these watershed cases, uneven acceptance and derivative litigation have defined forum selection bylaws’ short his90
tory until Boilermakers in June 2013. To date, 250 publicly91
traded corporations have adopted forum selection provisions.
At the same time, proxy advisor groups have been influential in
92
discouraging adoption of forum selection bylaws. In 2012
alone, stockholders initiated sixteen derivative suits over adop93
tions of or proposals for forum selection bylaws. Most of the
cases have been resolved by settlement in the stockholders’ favor, with the exception of derivative litigation against Chevron
and FedEx, which the Delaware Court of Chancery consolidat94
ed in the Boilermakers case.
89. Id. at 1174−75 (basing its decision on federal common law).
90. See infra notes 88−91.
91. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013); Claudia H. Allen, Delaware Corporations Seek to
Counter Forum Shopping, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND
FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/14/
delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/#more-25698. Contra
Quinn, supra note 8, at 171−72 (noting that during 2010, severa l high-profile
Delaware firms went public, including Toys “R” Us, Inc., General Motors
Company, and Tesla Motors, Inc., and none of them included exclusion forum
provisions in their corporate charters).
92. See Frank Acquila & Anna Kripitz, Forum-Selection Provisions in
Delaware, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, https://www.sullcrom.com/
Frank-Aquila-and-Anna-Kripitz-Author-Article-on-Delaware-Selection
-Provisions-08-27-2012/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); see also COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra, note 15 at 1.9 (“Companies should not attempt
to restrict the venue for shareowner claims by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive forum.”); GLASS LEWIS & CO.,
PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES, 2012 PROXY SEASON, 34 (2012), available at http://
www.summitinvestmentpartners.com/PDFs/ProxyVotingPolicy1.pdf [hereinafter GLASS LEWIS].
93. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISIONS: PUTTING ON THE
BRAKES, BLOOMBERG BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2012),
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Images/exclusive-forum
-provisions-putting-on-the-brakes.pdf. Katie Wagner, Exclusive-Forum Provisions Spur a Backlash: Suits Against Them Are Being Resolved in Stockholders’ Favor, AGENDA, May 7, 2012, at 10.
94. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 2. In February 2012, the firms Prickett,
Jones & Elliott, P.A. and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP filed substantially similar suits against 12 Delaware corporations that had adopted the
same forum selection clauses via bylaws (Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.,
AutoNation, Inc., Chevron Corporation, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Danaher
Corporation, FedEx Corporation, Franklin Resources, Inc., Navistar International Corporation, priceline.com incorporated, SPX Corporation, and Superior
Energy Services, Inc.). Id. Jack in the Box, Inc. was sued in April 2012. Id. In

2014] OH THE PLACES STOCKHOLDERS WILL GO!

1993

In Boilermakers, the Delaware Court of Chancery limited
its inquiry to two grounds: whether forum selection bylaws are
95
statutorily and contractually valid. It replied in the affirma96
tive on both accounts. The court in Boilermakers did not attempt a robust fiduciary duties analysis because it chose to address facial challenges to legality before it engaged in a “fact97
laden” analysis. Chancellor Strine explained forum selection
clauses regulate proper subject matter per DGCL 109(b), which
98
outlines the board’s authority. In regulating where stockholders may bring derivative, fiduciary duties, DGCL, and internal
affairs suits, forum selection bylaws relate to the “internal affairs” of the corporation – the “business of the corporation,” “the
“conduct of its affairs,” and the “rights or powers of stockhold99
ers.” Contractually, the clauses are prima facie valid and presumptively enforceable under Bremen, akin to contractual fo100
rum selection clauses. These clauses are “flexible,” binding
contracts between the corporation and stockholders so long as
the certificate confers power on the board to unilaterally adopt
101
bylaws under DGCL 109(a). The court refused to entertain
plaintiffs’ hypothetical “parade of horribles” of the detrimental
April 2012, the two firms also filed derivative lawsuits against four companies
that planned to address forum selection provisions at their 2012 annual stockholder meeting, either via charter amendments (Calix, Inc., Cameron International Corporation, and Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.) or via bylaw (Hittite Microwave Corporation). Id. at 3. Of the original twelve
corporations, only two have fought the suits; the other ten have repealed the
bylaws in question and the Delaware Court of Chancery has dismissed the
cases as moot. Id. In March 2012, a second lawsuit was filed against Chevron
Corporation in the Northern District of California, the same court that decided
Galaviz. Id. The California court stayed the case on August 9, 2012 for one
year, pending the Delaware Court of Chancery proceedings. Id. During the
2012 proxy season, Amalgamated Bank Longview Funds, Roper Industries,
Inc., Superior Energy Services, Inc., Chevron Corporation, and United Rentals, Inc. received stockholder repeal proposals. Id. at 5. Stockholders also sued
Chevron Corporation and Superior Industries, Inc. Id. Roper Industries sought
a no-action letter from the SEC, arguing that the stockholder proposal interfered with its ordinary business operations, but the SEC denied the request of
Roper Industries, along with Superior Energy Services repealed their bylaws.
Id. The remaining two corporations allowed the proposals, both of which were
defeated. Id.
95. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 947.
98. Id. at 950–51.
99. Id. at 939.
100. Id. at 955.
101. Id at 957.
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effects of forum selection bylaws in the absence of a genuine
102
controversy with concrete facts.
The next step in this progression is unclear and complicated. The impact of Boilermakers will depend on how and if
103
courts outside of Delaware apply its holding. The stockholder
plaintiffs in Boilermakers dropped their appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court, leaving Chancellor Strine’s June 2013 decision
104
as the authoritative word on the subject, for now. Since the
Delaware Court of Chancery held that forum selection clauses
bylaws relate to the internal affairs of the corporation, the
DGCL will apply as substantive law and the Boilermakers deci105
sion will govern. However, it is possible that non-Delaware
judges may construe choice of forum as a procedural issue,
106
meaning that the law of the forum would govern. This Note
focuses on how courts outside of Delaware will apply Boilermakers to potential breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate
directors and officers—issues that Chancellor Strine did not
reach. Therefore, it is necessary to delve into arguments for
and against in forum selection bylaws in the fiduciary duties
context to understand how to guide non-Delaware courts in adjudicating such cases. Boilermakers was groundbreaking, but it
will not be the last word.
II. ARE THEY ENFORCEABLE? AN OVERVIEW OF THE
COUNTERPARTIES’ AUTHORITY, FIDUCIARY DUTIES,
AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
In order for courts outside of Delaware to determine the
enforceability of forum selection bylaws in fiduciary duties cases, they will need to interpret Boilermakers in the fiduciary duties context. No court has directly confronted a fiduciary duties
102. Id. at 958.
103. In the aftermath of Boilermakers, Claudia Allen has noted that “The
interesting part will come when [Delaware corporations] are sued in another
state.” Partner Claudia Allen Discusses Forum Selection Bylaws with Reuters,
KATTEN MUNCHIN ROSENMAN LLP (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.kattenlaw
.com/35869.
104. Mirvis, supra note 20 (“It is now plain that board-adopted forum selection bylaws are valid and enforceable under Delaware law.”).
105. Tung, supra note 64, at 6.
106. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (construing the forum selection clause procedurally and using Second Circuit precedent to determine its enforceability
as to derivative plaintiffs); see also Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1174−75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss for improper venue on
corporate law grounds and instead relying on federal common law).
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analysis based on the DGCL to determine the enforceability of
forum selection bylaws. Chancellor Strine in Boilermakers explicitly refused to reach the necessarily “fact-laden,” case-bycase fiduciary duties analysis of whether a boards’ use of its by107
laws powers is inconsistent with its fiduciary duties. What
exists, and what courts will be confronted with, are divergent
views from stockholder-plaintiffs and proxy advisors in one
108
camp and scholars, now backed by Boilermakers, in anoth109
er. Neither group fully incorporates forum selection bylaws
into the necessary fiduciary duties framework that exists in
other areas of corporate law. The solution fills this void by proposing a step-by-step method of analyzing forum selection challenges. It builds on DGCL precedent regarding directors’ authority, fiduciary duties, and policy inquiries. In order to reach
this Solution, this Part will first analyze and refute opponents’
authority, fiduciary duties, and policy arguments. Next, it will
show why proponents’ multi-jurisdictional concerns and authority arguments are warranted and correct, but why they are incomplete in relation to the necessary fiduciary duties inquiry
and why the “fiduciary out” alternative should be rejected.
A. THE OPPONENTS: FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS ARE BAD
POLICY, THE BOARD LACKS AUTHORITY, & THE CLAUSES
VIOLATE DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES.
Proxy advisor groups, such as Glass, Lewis & Co., and
stockholder-plaintiffs are influential and adamantly against fo110
rum selection bylaws. Their views form the policy rationales,
director authority positions, and fiduciary duties arguments
111
that underlie opponents’ criticisms of these clauses.
The
proxy advisors have cautioned stockholders against board efforts to include forum selection bylaws, arguing that the claus112
es are detrimental to stockholder interests. Some proxy advisory groups have proposed requiring a case-by-case analysis of
whether the board meets certain good governance practices;
113
others suggest an outright ban. Stockholders-plaintiffs appear to be listening to proxy advisor groups and have chal107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 947.
See infra Part II(A).
See infra Part II(B).
See infra Part II(A)(1).
See infra Part II(A)(1)–(2).
See infra notes 118−19.
See infra Part II(A)(1).
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lenged forum selection bylaws on authority and fiduciary duties
114
grounds, among others. Opponents’ positions, however, are
an inadequate solution to determining the enforceability of fo115
rum selection bylaws outside of Delaware. They rest on a
shaky DGCL foundation that has been soundly rejected in the
116
Boilermakers case. The opponents’ arguments will be analyzed and critiqued; they are organized based on the source of
the criticism – proxy advisor groups or stock-holder plaintiffs.
1. Proxy Advisory Groups: Forum Selection Hurts
Stockholders
Proxy advisory groups’ stances are based on similar visions
of appropriate corporate governance policy. They range from an
unconditional ban to a mediated position that requires certain
corporate governance features. The Council of Institutional Investors unequivocally opposes adoption of all forum-selection
provisions because they are not in the best interest of stock117
holders. Glass, Lewis & Co., a governance analysis and proxy
voting firm, recommends against forum selection bylaws with
118
limited exceptions. MSCI/Institutional Shareholder Services
Inc. (ISS) has taken a more militated approach. During the
2011 and 2012 proxy seasons, ISS recommended against forumselection provisions unless a corporation follows four “best119
practices governance features.” These best practices included
114. See infra Part II(A)(2).
115. See infra Part III.
116. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934
(Del. Ch. 2013); infra Part II(B).
117. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 15, at 1.9
(“Companies should not attempt to restrict the venue for shareholder claims
by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive forum.”).
118. John F. Olson et al., ISS, Glass Lewis, and the 2013 Proxy Season,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 11, 2013,
9:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/11/iss-glass-lewis-and
-the-2013-proxy-season. This is a change from Glass Lewis’s previous position.
GLASS LEWIS, supra note 92, at 34 (“Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best
interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of
shareholder derivative claims by increasing their associated costs and making
them more difficult to pursue . . . . For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision.”); see also ALLEN supra, note 93, at 5 (adding that
Glass Lewis also opposes these provisions because they discourage stockholder
derivative suits by increasing costs).
119. Acquila & Kripitz, supra note 92.
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having an annually elected board, a majority vote standard for
uncontested director elections, no poison pills, and a meaning120
ful special meeting right for stockholders. During the 2012
proxy season, ISS modified its position by proposing a case-bycase balancing test that weighs good governance features
against whether the company has been materially harmed by
121
stockholder litigation outside its state of incorporation. These
groups’ recommendations have effectively slowed forum selec122
tion clause adoption via bylaws.
Overall, stockholders appear to be listening, but data from
the last few proxy seasons is mixed. During the 2011 proxy season, stockholders marginally approved certificate forum selection clauses, but did not repeal any unilaterally, board-adopted
123
forum selection bylaws. Results from four corporations during
the 2012 proxy season provide some support for exclusive fo124
rum provisions, but lack predictive value. However, in recent
2012 derivative litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
stockholders in ten of twelve suits have succeeded in having forum selection clauses or proposals for them removed; Boiler125
makers is the exception.
2. The Stockholders: Authority & Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Stockholder-plaintiffs’ complaints are nearly identical and
levy the same primary arguments against the enforceability of
forum selection clauses, many of which go beyond the focus of
126
this Note. This Note will limit analysis to authority and fidu120. Id.
121. Id. (removing the “meaningful special meeting” requirement as well).
122. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 327.
123. Acquila & Kripitz, supra note 92.
124. Id. (detailing how stockholders did not approve repealing such bylaws,
but conceding that only two corporations faced this question and that the other two repealed the bylaws in question).
125. See Wagner, supra note 93, at 10.
126. Besides the violation of fiduciary duties, they argue that the bylaws
are: overbroad and apply even if the court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction, they are not a proper application of the board’s power, they lack
mutual consent and notice, they conflict with federal constitutional and statutory provisions, they are unreasonable and therefore, invalid, and they force
the Delaware Court of Chancery to decide non-Delaware law issues. Id. Plaintiffs have also argued that they have a vested right under existing bylaws to
choose their litigation forum. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 327−28
(citing 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 25:4 (3d ed. 2011) (“In Delaware, the vested-rights doctrine is
generally recognized as a dead letter, and no contemporary decision is likely to
be resolved on this basis.”)); see also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483,
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127

ciary duties propositions. Stockholders argue that such bylaws regulate external matters and not internal corporate gov128
ernance and are therefore beyond the board’s authority. In
contractual terms, stockholders have argued that bylaws are
part of an internal governance contract that the board or stock129
holders have the power to amend. Furthermore, forum selec130
tion bylaws lack stockholders’ mutual consent and impermissibly regulate litigation, an external corporate activity, instead
131
of intra-corporate affairs.
However, on these authority grounds, stockholderplaintiffs ignore the board of director’s broad mandate to man132
age the “business and affairs of every corporation.” This power includes the ability to adopt bylaws that regulate both procedural and corporate governance matters, which arguably
133
include forum selection provisions. In Boilermakers, Chancellor Strine unequivocally agreed that such clauses are statutorily valid under DGCL section 109(b) and relate to the “internal
134
affairs” of the corporation. Stockholder-plaintiffs have a statutory, sacrosanct check under DGCL section 109(a) that enables them to remove forum selection bylaws, a more efficient
135
remedy than pursuing derivative litigation.
Stockholders also argue that adopting forum selection
clauses violate directors’ fiduciary duties. They identify directors’ self-interest and the uninformed basis of their decisions,
136
breaches of the duty of care and loyalty, respectively. Directors’ arguably have a material interest in the adoption of forum
492 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995) (“[W]here a corporation’s
by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no
vested rights can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.”).
127. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 2.
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2013); see, e.g., Boilermakers
Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 4.
129. See, e.g., Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 53.
130. Id.; Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171
−72 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(disputing the layering of corporate and contract law regarding forum selection bylaws).
131. Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 74.
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(a), 141(a) (West 2013); see infra Part
III(A).
133. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 373–74; see infra Part III(A).
134. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 950
(Del. Ch. 2013).
135. Id. at 956 (“[T]he power cannot be non-consensually eliminated or limited by anyone other than the legislature itself.”); see Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.
582, 588−89 (1933); infra Part III(A).
136. ALLEN, supra note 93, at 3.
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selection clauses because they can confine litigation to a forum
in which they are more likely to win, they avoid a jury trial,
137
and it is difficult to bring certain claims against them. In
Boilermakers, the stockholders-plaintiffs in fact conceded that
in abstract hypotheticals, forum selection bylaws would work
138
without any problem. Directors also may have adopted a forum selection bylaw without negotiation or independent con139
sideration of the Bylaw. Since no cases exist interpreting fiduciary duties under the DGCL outside of Delaware,
proponents’ positions must form the counterpoint to opponents’
criticism of forum selection bylaws.
B. PROPONENTS: A SOLUTION TO THE MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
PROBLEM, DIRECTORS’ AUTHORITY, AND SATISFACTION OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Proponents of forum selection clauses address and refute
proxy advisor groups and stockholder-plaintiffs’ policy, authori140
ty, and fiduciary duties arguments.
Professor Joseph
141
Grundfest has led the pro-enforceability charge. In addition
to advocating, he is responsible for crafting the prototypical fo142
rum selection bylaw. Corporate defendants who have fought
the February 2012 barrage of stockholder derivative litigations
143
augment Grundfest’s arguments. They establish a counterpoint to plaintiffs’ charges. The Boilermakers decision has
137. See, e.g., Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 105.
138. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 964.
139. Derivative Complaint for Shareholders, at ¶ 106, Bushansky v.
Armacost, No. C 12-01597 WHA, 2012 WL 3276937 (N.D, Cal. Aug. 9, 2012)
(adding that “the limited disclosure of the Bylaw provides virtually no information as to the reasons for and effects of the Bylaw . . . the Bylaw will have
numerous negative effects on Plaintiff and on the members of the Class”).
140. Corporate defendants advance more arguments, but analysis will be
limited to fiduciary duties and proper bylaw subject matter. Defendants inter
alia cite the travails of multi-jurisdictional litigation, the failure of alternative
solutions to forum selection bylaws, and plaintiffs’ parade of horribles. See
generally Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers, 73 A.3d 934 [hereinafter Brief for
Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund]. Forum selection clauses have
also been upheld under the Delaware LLC Act. See, e.g., Elf Atochem North
Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 288− 89, 293 (Del. 1999) (upholding the forum selection provision in arbitration agreement based on the policy of contractual freedom of the parties).
141. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1 passim.
142. Id. at 16 (identifying the Netsuite model for 92% of charter and bylaw
adoptions as of June 30, 2011).
143. See Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, supra note
140 passim.
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144

largely affirmed their efforts. Grundfest is not alone; many
others have supported forum selection bylaws as a useful response to the prospect of multi-jurisdictional litigation and en145
trepreneurial plaintiffs. Scholars and practitioners alike have
pointed to how forum selection stymies costly and inefficient lit146
igation by limiting it to one forum. In addition, proponents
have argued and Boilermakers has affirmed directors’ authority
to enact forum selection bylaws.
The bylaws are a proper application of directors’ authority
and are a tool of internal corporate governance. Section 109(a)
of the DGCL empowers directors to adopt bylaws if the charter
147
so provides. Bylaw provisions are contracts; contract case law
148
considers forum selections clauses prima facie valid.
The
board possesses a broad mandate under section 109(b) of the
149
DGCL to promulgate bylaws.
Both Chevron and FedEx
adopted exclusive forum selection provisions for intracorporate
disputes including derivative, fiduciary duties, DGCL, and oth150
er internal actions. These are matters of corporate govern151
ance. Proponents’ authority arguments have been accepted by
the Delaware Court of Chancery in Boilermakers, but the court
refused to enter the thicket of fact-intensive fiduciary duties
152
analysis. The solution proposed by this Note relies on the
court’s interpretation of the directors’ authority, and fits it into
the larger structure of how to determine the enforceability of
forum selection bylaws in cases with fiduciary duties challenges.
Leading proponents suggest that forum selection bylaws
should not be enforced if they violate directors’ fiduciary du153
ties. This “fiduciary out” provides corporate directors the op144. Boilermakers., 73 A.3d at 964.
145. Id. at 944 n.31.
146. Id. at 943.
147. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013).
148. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del.
2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s
shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); see also
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593−95 (1991).
149. See supra Part I(A)(2).
150. Brief for Defendant, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, supra note
140, at 27–35.
151. Compare id., with Boilermakers Verified Complaint, supra note 16, at
¶ 53.
152. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 964.
153. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 400–01.
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portunity to consent to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum if their fi154
duciary duties are implicated. Proponents argue that directors’ choice of forum would not involve their fiduciary duty, “unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that Delaware courts will fail to
155
hold directors properly responsible for their actions.” Effectively, plaintiffs would be charging that they cannot rely upon
156
the Delaware judiciary to enforce the boards’ fiduciary duties.
The nature of fiduciary duty claims depends on the facts and
circumstances of individual cases, not those anticipated in the
157
abstract. Successful claims would be rare; forum selection by158
laws are likely enforceable, even in fiduciary duties contexts.
However, a “fiduciary out,” while a useful tool for corporate defendants to concede to jurisdiction, does not provide an articulable method for adjudicating the enforceability of forum selection bylaws. It places discretion in the hands of corporate
defendants, but leaves both stockholders and non-Delaware
159
courts without a predictable decision-making framework. The
following solution relies on accepted authority arguments and
builds them into a step-by-step method of adjudicating fiduciary duties in derivative actions.
III. WHERE WILL THEY GO? A GUIDE FOR
DETERMINING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM
SELECTION BYLAWS IN COURTS OUTSIDE OF
DELAWARE
This Note proposes a prescriptive framework situated
within DGCL law. It aims at aiding foreign jurisdictions in deciding the enforceability of forum selection bylaws in fiduciary
duties derivative suits. The solution provides a step-by-step
guide. First, in terms of pure power, corporate boards of directors have the authority under the DGCL and other states’ laws
160
to adopt forum selection bylaws. Boilermakers confirmed this
161
proposition. Second, this authority creates a rebuttable presumption of enforceability of the clauses, buttressed by the
154. Id. at 402.
155. Id. (adding that the existence of a choice of forum provision alone is
neither sufficient to prove self-interest, nor a breach of the duty of loyalty).
156. Id. at 403.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See infra Part III.
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013).
161. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958
(Del. Ch. 2013).
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business judgment rule. Finally, in order to rebut this presumption, stockholder-plaintiffs must establish a violation of a
fiduciary duty, specifically the duty of care and/or the duty of
163
loyalty. Specific examples of fiduciary duties violations, dependent on timing, inform this section. The solution develops
each of these steps and fits the framework into the existing
DGCL law taken from other contexts that engage in a fiduciary
164
duties analysis. The novelty of this approach lies in its mediation of defendants’ genuine multi-jurisdictional concerns and
plaintiffs’ legitimate fiduciary claims, an approach that critics
165
have failed to fully address.
A. STEP 1: THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD
Directors’ authority to adopt forum selection bylaws has
been established by Boilermakers, and it serves as the first step
of the decision-making framework for jurisdictions outside of
166
Delaware. As a matter of corporate law, Delaware boards of
directors have the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws if
167
they are so authorized by the certificate of incorporation. In
order to secure this authority, incorporators may simply adopt
a charter provision prior to the issuance of shares that allows
168
the board to adopt bylaws. Section 109(a) must be read in
conjunction with section 141(a) of the DGCL which mandates
that the, “business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
169
of a board of directors.” Delaware courts recognize the boards
170
possess this “large reservoir of authority.”
Directors can
adopt bylaws with a simple majority vote of the quorum pre171
sent at a meeting. As an application of the board’s power, fo162. See supra Part I(A)(1).
163. See supra Part I(A)(1).
164. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1989).
165. See supra Parts II(A), (B).
166. Boilermakers, 72 A.3d at 954, 963.
167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2013) (“Notwithstanding the
foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 141(a); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)
(“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of
the corporation.”).
170. Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985).
171. Tit. 8, § 141(b).
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rum selection clauses as Vice Chancellor Laster notes, “provide
172
an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution.”
Directors’ authority to enact forum selection bylaws is consistent with contract law, a point that follows from their au173
thority and that Boilermakers confirms. The board possesses
a broad mandate under section 109(b) of the DGCL to promulgate bylaws. Generally, Delaware corporate bylaws regulate
174
procedural and corporate governance matters.
Delaware
courts employ a “context and purpose” test to determine the
175
procedural nature of a bylaw. Forum selection clauses adopted via bylaws, similarly to other procedural bylaws, arguably
fit within this domain because of their predominantly proce176
dural nature. However directors’ authority to adopt forum selection bylaws does not foreclose stockholders from successfully
challenging and removing the clauses through internal corporate processes.

172. In re Revlon, S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
173. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 381. Contra Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. LAW REV. 595, 604
(1997) (“In short, the fiduciary relationship and its obligations serve functions
not addressed by ‘mere’ contract in a world that puts a premium on individual
autonomy, let alone in a cooperating world that takes a broader view of the
psychological and social needs and functions of human beings.”). In the corporate context, courts impute consent to parties absent “[rejection of] any or all
of those rules, which they are presumed to be free to do.” Id. at 623. Unilateral
adoption of bylaws by the board is an example of imputed consent because assent is assumed absent an explicit agreement otherwise. See id. Imputed consent does not mean that stockholders actually consent or that their agreement
becomes part of a “contractual” agreement. Instead, it remains within the corporate context. See id. at 623−24.
174. See McDonnell, supra note 42, at 217, 221; see also CA, Inc. v.
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008); Gow v. Consol.
Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933) (“[A]s the charter is an instrument in which the broad and general aspects of the corporate entity’s existence and nature are defined, so the by-laws are generally regarded as the
proper place for the self-imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for
its convenient functioning to be laid down.”).
175. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 373 (citing AFSCME Emps.
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d at 236−37).
176. See id. at 374–75. For example, several procedural-themed bylaws exist in the DGCL, including inter alia § 141(b) which authorizes bylaws that fix
the number of directors on the board, quorum requirements, and votes needed
for board actions; § 211(a) and (b) which establish the date and location for the
annual stockholder meeting; § 211(d) outlines stockholder special meeting requirements; § 216 establishes quorum and voting requirements for stockholders; and § 222 which promulgates notice requirements for stockholder meetings. Tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 211(a)−(b), (d), 216.
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Stockholders have a reciprocal, statutory right to use direct
or indirect means to remove director-enacted bylaws, without
177
resorting to derivative litigation. First, stockholders can directly override the board’s authority to adopt bylaw provisions:
“[t]he fact that such power has been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest
the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their power
178
to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws.” Second, stockholders can
indirectly impose their preferences regarding governance issues
through the director-election process. For example, if the stockholders do not like the actions taken by the board, they can
179
elect new directors at the next annual stockholder meeting.
Moreover, at any time, even between annual meetings, “[a]ny
director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with
or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then
180
entitled to vote at an election of directors.” Next, a nonDelaware court would apply a rebuttable presumption of enforceability of the clauses based on directors’ authority that is
181
buttressed by the business judgment rule.
B. STEPS 2 & 3: A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
ENFORCEABILITY AND HOW TO (POSSIBLY) OVERCOME IT.
Directors’ authority to enact forum selection clauses via bylaws creates a presumption of their enforceability á la business
182
judgment rule. The business judgment rule forms this starting point for the next step. It provides that directors acted pursuant to their fiduciary duties, which means that they acted on
177. Delaware corporate stockholders have several options that do not involve derivative litigation. First, they could simply repeal or amend the director-enacted bylaw by a simple majority vote (unless the bylaws require a higher vote). See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 588−89 (1933) (explaining that, as an
incident of stockholders’ ownership and voting power of their shares, they
have a plenary, statutory right to repeal or amend directors’ bylaws). Second,
stockholders could except forum selection clauses from the board’s power to
enact bylaws. See tit. 8, § 141(a). Third, stockholders may take indirect action
by voting or threatening to vote out directors who adopted the bylaw with the
forum selection clause. See tit. 8, § 141(k).
178. Tit. 8, § 109(a).
179. Tit. 8, § 211(b) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for
the election of directors . . . .”).
180. Tit. 8, § 141(k).
181. See supra Part I(A)(1).
182. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (explaining that the business judgment rule is an outgrowth from the codified delegation of management powers in § 141(a) of the DGCL).

2014] OH THE PLACES STOCKHOLDERS WILL GO!

2005

an informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief the ac183
tions they took were in the best interests of the corporation.
The business judgment rules serves as formidable protection
for corporate directors and officers. In order for stockholderplaintiffs to rebut the presumption of enforceability in the context of forum selection clauses, they may introduce evidence of
184
directors’ breaches of the duty of care of the duty of loyalty.
If stockholder-plaintiffs are successful and rebut the presumption of enforceability, courts should proceed to the third
step and review the transaction under an entire fairness stand185
186
ard. This necessarily involves a case-by-case inquiry. In order to flesh out the second and third steps, which are necessarily intertwined, the solution walks through circumstances that
may feasibly arise or have arisen in the duty of care and duty of
loyalty contexts. Unlike in Boilermakers, this exercise does not
aim to outline a “parade of horribles” or engage with hypothet187
ical, law school-esque scenarios. Instead, the purpose of ap183. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1988) (“As a rule of evidence, [the business judgment rule] creates ‘a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’ The presumption initially attaches to a director-approved transaction within a board’s conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence of ‘fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment.’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
184. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that
the plaintiff has a burden of proof to rebut this presumption by introducing
evidence of self-dealing or lack of due care), overruled on other grounds by
Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695 (2009); see supra Part I(A).
185. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362−63 (Del. 1993),
modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
186. See, e.g., Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach thereof, are both questions of fact.”).
This approach disavows a bright line rule that advocates for or against the enforceability of forum selection clauses. Cf. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5,
at 402 (rejecting a bright-line rule, but articulating a different fiduciary duties
analysis).
187. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2013). Compare Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 364
(“Courts applying Delaware law to adjudicate the validity of an ICFS provision
as adopted therefore need not speculate as to every conceivable circumstance
that might later arise in connection with a future effort to enforce that provision under conditions that are unknown and unknowable as of the date of the
provision’s adoption.”), with Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del. 1992)
(“There was no basis to invoke some hypothetical risk of harm rather than an
examination of the board’s proven, and entirely proper, conduct.”). It is appropriate to consider various fact scenarios for the purpose of generating a pre-
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plying this framework in possible situations is that they will
likely arise in “as-applied” circumstances in future fiduciary
duties derivative litigation. Therefore, the duty of care will first
be analyzed, followed by the duty of loyalty.
1. The Duty of Care
Plaintiffs may show a violation of the duty of care sufficient to pass step two by demonstrating that directors did not
188
engage in a process of informed decision-making. This analysis requires consideration of more than whether “Delaware
courts will fail to hold directors properly responsible for their
189
actions.” Directors must reach their decision to adopt a bylaw
with a forum selection clause through “informed, reasonable de190
liberation.” Fortunately for directors, the travails of multijurisdictional litigation and the phenomenon of the lead plaintiff race are well-documented and easily serve as a basis for
191
rational decision. In addition, the fiduciaries’ conduct is only
192
actionable if the directors are grossly negligent. Plaintiffs’ assertions that directors fail to consider the effect of forum selection clauses on stockholders likely misses this mark sufficient
to rebut the presumption of enforceability à la business judg193
ment rule. If directors truly were irrational, for example,
identifying Delaware as an exclusive forum for a Minnesota
corporation, they may come closer to rebutting the presumption
of enforceability. Instead, stockholders may be more successful

scriptive decisionmaking framework. In an actual case, the court is bound by
the facts, not by hypothetical inquiries. These two situations are distinct, and
prescriptive/normative analysis can inform and construct the decisionmaking
process.
188. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. This paragraph assumes that the corporation does not have an exculpation provision described in Delaware law.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013).
189. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 402.
190. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
191. See supra Part I(B). Contra Revised Verified Supplement to the Complaint at ¶14, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73
A.3d 934 (2013) (No. 7220-CS) (“[T]he only duplicative litigation Chevron and
its Board have experienced resulted from the Exclusive Forum Bylaw whose
purported purpose was to avoid duplicative litigation.” (emphasis in original)).
192. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 750
(Del. Ch. 2005) (adding that duty of care violations are rarely found).
193. See Verified Complaint at ¶ 95, Neighbors v. Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc., No. 7240-CS, 2012 WL 467520 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012) (arguing inter
alia, that adoption of a form bylaw evinces directors’ lack of consideration of
the specific terms and effects of the bylaw at issue).
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in identifying a breach of the duty of loyalty in order to proceed
to the third step that triggers the “entire fairness” standard.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
A successful rebuttal of the presumption of enforceability
sufficient to proceed to the third step may depend on the timing
of the duty of loyalty claim. The timing of duty of loyalty challenges fit into three groups: pre-planning before a suit is filed,
after alleged wrongdoing, and in the midst of ongoing litigation.
Similarly to the duty of care context, stockholder-plaintiffs face
a distinct uphill battle in rebutting the presumption of enforceability sufficient to have a court determine the “entire fairness”
of the transaction.
The first scenario is an extension of anti-takeover and poison pill jurisprudence, in which courts allow corporations to
keep anti-takeover methods on the shelf for potential, future
194
use. As in that context, it is unlikely that courts would find
self-dealing if directors adopted a clause as a form of pre195
planning for possible, future derivative litigation.
In the second scenario, a board’s adoption of a clause after
alleged wrongdoing provides a clearer self-dealing scenario;
196
Galaviz v. Berg can be reconciled in this way. In the Galaviz
scenario, the board can proffer few alternative reasons for their
197
actions other than their self-interest in escaping liability. In
so doing, they effectively place their self-interest over the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Although confining litigation to Delaware does not assure directors’ success,
194. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.
J. 1087, 1088−89 (2012) (“Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively
‘poison pills,’ enable a target board to ‘poison’ a takeover attempt by making it
prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage
of the target company’s stock . . . . [Delaware courts generally] have approved
traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices for well-intentioned
boards of directors.”).
195. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 366 (analogizing forum selection clauses to poison pills as a pre-planning tool for hostile takeovers).
196. See, e.g., Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171
−72 (N.D. Cal.
2011). The holding of the Galaviz case can be reconciled with this prescriptive
framework because, as a matter of corporate law, it implicates a fact scenario
that involves self-dealing. Contra Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 5, at 407
(arguing that the Galaviz court ignored controlling precedent when it relied on
a vested rights theory to find the forum selection clause unenforceable). A selfdealing supersedes considerations of whether the plaintiffs’ claims have vested.
197. See, e.g., Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
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198

it certainly increases their odds. Delaware courts confer benefits on directors, strategic advantages that stockholders do not
199
necessarily share.
Finally, directors could also adopt a clause in the midst of
pending litigation in a foreign court. Again, stockholders could
implicate directors’ self-dealing incentives in adopting the
200
clause. This scenario provides a direct affront to contract law,
although this may be difficult to establish after Boilermakers
upheld the contractual validity of forum selection in the corpo201
rate context.
While the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in contract law is well-settled, contract law likely does
not allow one party to unilaterally add a forum selection clause
202
after litigation has begun. Parties must instead resort to hav203
ing cases dismissed, transferred, or stayed. Though most cases will likely be stalled at the second step, rebutting the presumption of enforceability of forum selection clauses, the
possibility of reaching the “entire fairness” standard provides a
roadmap for courts to follow in these cases. Indeed, it provides
the best alternative to existing counterarguments.
C. ALTERNATIVES ARE INEFFECTIVE
Yet alternatives exist. Some advocate an outright ban on
forum selection bylaws in the corporate context, or a slightly
more mediated solution as long as directors engage in good
204
governance. Opponents cannot turn a blind eye to the very
real inconvenience and waste of resources that is caused by un205
constrained multi-jurisdictional litigation. In most contexts,
198. See supra Part I(B).
199. See supra Part I(B).
200. This argument is distinct from whether stockholders have perfected
their right to sue in a foreign forum. But c.f. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note
5, at 377 (discussing how stockholders have typically failed to perfect their
right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction).
201. See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. at 1174 (“To whatever degree bylaws may
generally be contractual in nature, however, Oracle here seeks to rely on principles of corporate law with respect to how its bylaws could be amended. Oracle has not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a venue provision that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to existing
contract terms.” (emphasis in original)). Contra Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013).
202. See supra Part I(A)(4).
203. See id. Whether a court dismisses, transfers, or stays a case depends
on the court and/or the state.
204. See supra Part II(A)(1).
205. See supra Part I(B).
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forum selection clauses provide a useful solution to the travails
of multi-jurisdictional litigation. A rebuttable presumption of
enforceability provides plaintiffs with an avenue in which to
bring legitimate fiduciary duties claims, while weeding out
strike suits.
Unconditional enforcement of forum selection bylaws faces
similar problems, but strikes a different, improper balance.
Stockholders with possible fiduciary duties’ arguments could be
locked out of their preferred venues, in a full concession to multi-jurisdictional problems. Grundfest’s “fiduciary out” solution,
that allows directors to waive the forum selection bylaw, fits
with this Note’s proposed solution. Together, they establish a
compromise: directors monitor their fiduciary duties and stockholders may rebut the presumption of directors’ authority. If
directors concede to a venue or stockholders are successful, litigation proceeds; if not, the case continues in Delaware, which is
not a bad alternative.
Finally, doing nothing is not an option. This hotly-debated
and increasingly-litigated topic demands a solution. This Note
provides a fiduciary duties-specific solution for courts outside of
Delaware to when they inevitably encounter these cases.
CONCLUSION
In re Revlon, Galaviz, and Boilermakers began the discussion about the enforceability of forum selection bylaws, but significant questions remain. It is unclear how non-Delaware
courts will interpret this progression of cases, especially when
plaintiffs raise breach of fiduciary duties claims about directors’
uses of the forum selection bylaws. This Note proposes and develops a structure for the resolution of these disputes. Forum
selection bylaws should be presumptively enforceable because
of directors’ authority to adopt bylaws. Plaintiffs may challenge
this rebuttable presumption by showing that directors breached
their duties of care and/or loyalty. If they are successful, directors must demonstrate the “entire fairness” of the forum selection bylaw to stockholders. At all times, directors could waive
the forum selection bylaws if their fiduciary duties so require.
In this way, courts mediate a compromise between corporate
defendants’ and stockholder-plaintiffs’ competing interests and
in effect, organize this section of intracorporate litigation within existing DGCL precedent. For non-Delaware courts, today
may not be the day, but when it is, this Note will help them get
on their way.

